NOTE: This article is a condensed version of several sources and viewpoints that may conflict with other sources. For a complete factual account of operation "Lamar Plain", please refer to "After Action Report on Operation Lamar Plain" filed 15 Sept 1969, by Col. Frank L. Deitrich, the commanding officer of the 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division (AMBL) |
I cannot take credit for what you are about to read. The credit goes to John Hayes, from McKinney, Texas, who was the first one to write about Lamar Plain. It also goes to the faceless personnel from the 1st Brigade who prepared an extensive After Action Report after we returned home to Camp Eagle. And last but not the least, to Jim Matthews, our Banshee Association President and his crew, who have spent countless hours at the National Archives searching for material. All I have done is put it together for you guys, we knew so little about the nature of the operation at Tam Ky, about how we fit in the big picture. We spent 90 days in Tam Ky, 90 days of our lives and for some, their final days. It is to them I dedicate this effort. Banshee 46
Apache Snow got all the headlines
back in the United States during the month of May 1969. The grunts called
it something else: Hamburger Hill, and the name stuck. But it was
not the only major battle fought by the troopers of the 101st Airborne
Division during that summer. Operation Nathan Hale, though smaller in scale
than the action in the A Shau Valley, was just as fierce and, for those
who fell there, just as deadly. It also earned a description from the enemy
as "the big fight with the little helicopters.” 
The 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, was involved in Apache Snow as
a blocking and screening force that was positioned a couple of terrain
features to the southeast of the A Shau Valley. The assets used included
pink teams of the 2nd Squadron, 17th Cavalry (2/17 Air Cav), and white
teams consisting of OH-6As from the 1st Brigade Scout Section and AH-lG
Cobras from the 2nd Battalion, 77th Artillery (2/77 ARA aerial rocket artillery).
Rather than seeking targets to destroy, the scout teams were more interested
in gathering intelligence for future develop-ment. And there was plenty
of intelligence to gather. The closer the teams reconnoitered to the Laotian
border and the A Shau, the larger the bunker complexes became; some even
boasted two story hooches beneath the triple-canopy jungle.
Before the 1st Brigade could turn its attention to this area, however, there came a dramatic change in mission. At 0300, on May 15, 1969, the pilots and crew of the aviation units were awakened and told to report to Operations (Ops) for a briefing ASAP. Speculation among the young pilots and the real situation seemed almost as bade Americal Division, based 100 miles to the south at Chu Lai, had declared a TAC E - tactical emergency. The Marine air base there, home of MAG 13 - Marine Aircraft Group - was threatened, and the nearby district capital of Tam Ky was in imminent danger of being overrun. Several American firebases (FSB’s), particularly at FSB, were nearly under siege. U.S. company-sized elements were being engaged and defeated in broad daylight; this was unheard of.  next
LZ |
